Taking Back a Guilty Plea: What the Kohberger Petition Reveals About Post-Conviction Relief

Interior of an empty courtroom with the judge's bench
A guilty plea is entered on the record, under oath. Photo by Thanh Ly via Unsplash.

Bryan Kohberger, who pleaded guilty in 2025 to murdering four University of Idaho students and is serving four consecutive life sentences, has filed a handwritten petition for post-conviction relief asking an Idaho court to let him take that plea back. He is representing himself. He claims his lawyers failed to review exculpatory evidence with him and made assurances about prison conditions that induced him to plead.

We have no view on the merits, and we are not licensed in Idaho. But the questions the filing raises are ones we field constantly in Wake County and in the Eastern District of North Carolina: I said yes in court, and I regret it. Can I undo it?

Timing Changes Everything

North Carolina treats a plea very differently depending on when you try to withdraw it. Before sentencing, a defendant who moves to withdraw need only show a fair and just reason, a relatively forgiving standard our Supreme Court adopted in State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532 (1990). Courts weigh things like whether the defendant has asserted innocence, how quickly he moved, whether he had competent counsel, and what prejudice the State would suffer.

After sentencing, the door narrows dramatically. At that point a defendant must show manifest injustice. Practically speaking, buyer’s remorse is not enough. Neither is a sentence that turned out harsher than hoped, or a co-defendant who fared better, or new second thoughts about the strength of the State’s case.

The Vehicle in North Carolina Is the MAR

Idaho uses a post-conviction procedure act. North Carolina’s analogue is the Motion for Appropriate Relief, governed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1411 and following. An MAR filed more than ten days after judgment must rest on one of the grounds in § 15A-1415(b), which include a conviction obtained in violation of the state or federal constitution.

Two features of the MAR trip people up. First, the burden sits entirely with the defendant, who must prove his grounds by a preponderance of the evidence. This is the reverse of trial, where the State proves everything beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, § 15A-1419 allows a court to deny claims the defendant was in a position to raise earlier and did not. Sitting on a claim is often fatal to it.

The Transcript Is the Obstacle

The single biggest hurdle in a case like this is the plea colloquy itself.

Under Boykin v. Alabama and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022, a judge cannot accept a guilty plea without questioning the defendant on the record. The statute requires the judge to confirm the defendant understands the charges and the maximum punishment, that he is satisfied with his lawyer’s services, and, critically, that no one has made him any promise other than the plea arrangement disclosed in open court. The defendant answers under oath. The answers are transcribed.

That colloquy exists precisely to defeat later claims of secret promises. In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court described a defendant’s declarations at a plea hearing as carrying a strong presumption of truth. But the Court also held those declarations are not an absolute barrier, and it allowed a hearing on a claim that counsel had promised an off-record sentence. The presumption is heavy. It is not conclusive.

Ineffective Assistance in the Plea Context

Most successful challenges to a plea are framed as ineffective assistance of counsel. The test comes from Strickland v. Washington: deficient performance, plus prejudice. In the plea setting, Hill v. Lockhart defines prejudice as a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to trial.

That framework covers real failures. A lawyer who never reviewed discovery, who misadvised a client about the actual sentencing exposure, or who failed to warn a noncitizen client about deportation consequences as required by Padilla v. Kentucky may have performed deficiently. What the framework does not cover is a defendant who understood the deal, accepted it to avoid a worse outcome, and later wished he had gambled.

Claims that a plea was not knowing and voluntary can also arise from a defendant’s mental state at the time. We have written about competency to stand trial in North Carolina, and competency to plead is measured by the same standard.

Waiving Appeal Is Not Waiving Everything

Kohberger’s plea agreement waived his right to appeal, and many North Carolina and federal plea agreements contain similar language. That waiver forecloses a direct appeal. It generally does not foreclose a collateral attack arguing that the plea itself was the product of ineffective assistance, because a defendant cannot meaningfully waive review of the very process by which the waiver was obtained. This is why MARs and federal § 2255 motions remain available after a broad appellate waiver.

The Real Lesson

Post-conviction relief is a narrow, difficult, and slow remedy. The overwhelming majority of these petitions fail. The far better protection is on the front end.

Before you plead, insist on seeing the discovery yourself. Ask your lawyer to explain the realistic trial outcome, not just the offer. Understand that anything you are told outside the courtroom that does not make it into the plea transcript may as well not exist. And answer the judge’s questions honestly, because those answers will be quoted back to you for years.

Damon Chetson is a Board Certified Specialist in State and Federal Criminal Law who has tried more than 25 jury trials and evaluates plea offers against what the evidence would actually look like in front of a jury. If you are weighing a plea, or believe a prior plea was entered without adequate advice, contact our office to speak with a Raleigh criminal defense lawyer.

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