A May 2026 Fourth Circuit decision has significant implications for defendants facing federal bank robbery charges in North Carolina and across the circuit. In United States v. Straite, No. 23-6872 (4th Cir. May 18, 2026), the court held that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The ruling affirmed a sentence that included a mandatory consecutive penalty for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence—and it closes an important avenue defendants have used to challenge such enhancements.
If you or a loved one is facing federal charges involving bank robbery or firearms, understanding how courts classify these offenses can be decisive. At The Chetson Firm, we follow these developments closely and apply them directly to our clients’ cases.
Background: What Happened in Straite?
Monte Straite and his crew robbed a Bank of America branch in Davie County, North Carolina in 2009, brandishing firearms and assaulting bank employees. Months later, they attempted to rob the same bank again—but this time the branch manager recognized them, locked the building, and stopped the robbery before it could be completed. Straite was convicted of both completed armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), along with convictions for brandishing a firearm during and in relation to both offenses under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
The core legal question on appeal was whether the attempted armed bank robbery conviction could serve as a predicate “crime of violence” to support the § 924(c) firearm charge. If it could not, Straite’s § 924(c) conviction on that count would be invalid—a potentially significant sentencing reduction.
The Elements Clause and the Crime of Violence Definition
Under § 924(c)(3)(A)—commonly called the “elements clause”—an offense is a “crime of violence” only if it has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in United States v. Taylor invalidated the broader “residual clause” that courts had previously used to sweep in many additional offenses. Post-Taylor, defendants have had more success arguing that inchoate crimes—attempts and conspiracies—do not necessarily require the use of force and therefore do not qualify as crimes of violence.
The Straite court acknowledged this argument has real force for unarmed attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a). The 1984 decision in United States v. McFadden held that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) requires only intent and a substantial step—neither of which necessarily involves force. The panel noted tension between McFadden and the statute’s text, which uses “by force and violence, or by intimidation” in a way that grammatically modifies both completed and attempted robbery, but panels cannot overrule prior panels, so McFadden remains binding.
Why § 2113(d) Is Different
The court did not need to overturn McFadden to resolve Straite’s case, because § 2113(d) contains independent language that takes the analysis in a different direction. That subsection imposes enhanced penalties on anyone who, “in committing, or in attempting to commit” a bank robbery offense, “assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.”
Unlike a bare attempt under § 2113(a), conviction under § 2113(d) requires that the defendant actually assault someone or put a person’s life in jeopardy with a dangerous weapon—even when the offense is only an attempt. The court reasoned that assault and putting life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon each categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. As a result, § 2113(d) categorically satisfies the elements clause, and attempted armed bank robbery is a crime of violence.
The court also dispatched two narrower arguments from Straite. First, he argued that § 2113(d)’s reference to “any person” could theoretically reach someone who puts only himself in jeopardy—which would not constitute force against “another.” The court rejected this by noting that assault, by its common-law definition, cannot be committed against oneself. Second, Straite argued that § 2113(d) has no mens rea requirement, which would allow convictions for reckless conduct—and under Borden v. United States, crimes of violence must involve purposeful or knowing conduct. The court answered this by extending its holdings in Garcia v. Gonzales and United States v. McNeal: only intentional, not reckless, application of force qualifies as “use,” so the statute implicitly requires the intent that Borden demands.
What This Means for Federal Defendants in North Carolina
The practical takeaway from Straite is that defendants convicted of attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) will have a very difficult time challenging associated § 924(c) convictions. The Fourth Circuit has definitively closed that argument. However, the court’s commentary on § 2113(a) is notable: it openly questioned McFadden‘s interpretation and highlighted that the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have each interpreted similar statutory language to require force even for attempt offenses. That circuit tension could eventually prompt en banc reconsideration or Supreme Court review.
For defendants in the Middle District of North Carolina and across the Fourth Circuit, this decision underscores how important it is to have federal criminal defense counsel who understands categorical analysis and firearms sentencing enhancements. We wrote previously about related developments in federal sentencing guidelines changes and federal conspiracy and RICO prosecutions, both of which intersect with the firearms sentencing issues raised in Straite.
Contact The Chetson Firm
Damon Chetson is a federal criminal defense attorney and Board Certified Specialist in State and Federal Criminal Law—one of fewer than 100 such specialists in North Carolina. He has represented clients in complex federal matters ranging from bank robbery to large-scale RICO prosecutions, including winning an acquittal in the largest federal RICO case in United States history. If you are facing federal charges in North Carolina and want to understand how decisions like Straite affect your case, contact The Chetson Firm at our Raleigh office for a consultation.