One of the most consequential decisions in a federal fraud case is whether the defendant faces a single trial on all charges or separate trials on distinct schemes. Trying multiple alleged crimes together can be devastating: jurors who hear about two frauds may be tempted to conclude the defendant is simply a dishonest person. A recent published opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Lawrence, decided April 14, 2026, offers a clear roadmap for how federal courts decide these “joinder” and “severance” questions—and why they are so hard for defendants to win.
The case is a useful teaching tool for anyone charged with multiple federal fraud counts, because it walks through both halves of the analysis: whether charges were properly joined in the first place, and, if so, whether the trial judge should nonetheless have split them apart.
Two Separate Schemes, One Indictment
Derickson Lawrence owned a small business that provided “paycard” services—debit-card-style payroll accounts—to a company operating several Golden Corral restaurants. According to the court, beginning in 2017 Lawrence quietly moved more than $200,000 of cardholders’ payroll funds into his personal brokerage account and used the money to trade stock options, concealing the losses with retroactive fees and by restricting his client’s access to balance information. When the paycard business collapsed in 2019, Lawrence applied for a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan in early 2020, submitting falsified records to claim the defunct company was still paying employees.
He was indicted on ten counts tied to the paycard scheme and one count tied to the PPP loan. Before trial, Lawrence asked the court to sever the PPP count and try it separately. The district court refused, a jury convicted him on all eleven counts, and he received an 87-month sentence enhanced for using “sophisticated means.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board.
Step One: Was Joinder Proper Under Rule 8(a)?
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) allows the government to charge multiple offenses together when they are of the same or similar character, arise from the same transaction, or form part of a common scheme. The Fourth Circuit described this as permitting “very broad” joinder to avoid duplicating witnesses and juries—but stressed the rule is “not infinitely elastic.” Something more than the same defendant and overlapping timing is required.
The court found the two schemes sufficiently connected. Both ran through the same business, used the same concealment methods, and shared overlapping witnesses and proof. Critically, the court found that the paycard fraud “precipitated” the PPP fraud: once the paycard scheme collapsed and Lawrence needed cash, he turned to the PPP loan. Both were also charged under the federal wire fraud statute. That logical and intimate connection—where one offense helps set up or carry out another—made the initial joinder proper.
Step Two: Should the Court Have Severed Anyway?
Even properly joined charges can be split under Rule 14 if joinder would unfairly prejudice the defendant. But as the Supreme Court held in Zafiro v. United States, severance is required only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right or prevent a reliable verdict. And trial judges have wide discretion to use “less drastic measures,” like jury instructions, instead of separate trials.
Lawrence raised two prejudice arguments, and the court rejected both. First, he argued the jury would infer a general “fraudulent character” and convict him on the paycard counts simply because the PPP fraud looked strong. The court held that strong direct evidence of guilt, combined with a standard instruction telling jurors to consider each count separately, neutralized that risk. This is the heart of why propensity arguments rarely succeed—the law presumes jurors follow limiting instructions.
Second, Lawrence argued he wanted to testify about the paycard scheme but stay silent on the PPP count, and that the split would invite an adverse inference. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this can sometimes justify severance, but only if the defendant makes a particularized showing: that he has important testimony to give on one count and a genuine, strong need to stay silent on the other. Lawrence offered neither. He never described what his testimony would be, and his stated reasons—a generic fear of adverse inferences and a desire to let his lawyer build a documentary defense—were the kind of run-of-the-mill concerns present in nearly every multi-count case. Allowing such generic assertions to force severance, the court warned, would hand control over joinder to defendants rather than judges.
The Practical Takeaway
The lesson for defendants facing multiple fraud counts is that severance motions demand specificity and strategy. A boilerplate claim of prejudice will almost never carry the day. To have any chance of separate trials, the defense must connect the dots concretely: explain precisely what testimony the defendant would offer on one count, why that testimony matters, and why testifying on another count would cause real harm. Equally important is attacking the threshold joinder question itself—if the schemes truly lack a logical and intimate connection, the better argument may be that they should never have been joined under Rule 8(a) at all.
This decision also underscores how aggressively the government pursues fraud cases, a theme we have explored in our coverage of federal conspiracy and RICO prosecutions. And because fraud convictions frequently turn on enhancements like the “sophisticated means” adjustment applied here, defendants should understand how the 2025-2026 federal sentencing guidelines changes can dramatically affect their exposure.
If you are facing federal fraud charges involving multiple alleged schemes, the joinder and severance decisions made early in your case can shape the entire trial. Attorney Damon Chetson is a Board Certified Specialist in State and Federal Criminal Law—one of fewer than a dozen in Wake County—with deep experience litigating complex white collar and fraud cases. To discuss your situation, contact The Chetson Firm at 19 W. Hargett St., Suite 400, Raleigh, NC, for a confidential consultation.