A February 2026 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—which covers North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia—offers a significant look at how federal prosecutors can pursue hate crime charges under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. In United States v. Daqua Ritter, No. 24-4576 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026), the court affirmed a life sentence for a man convicted of murdering a transgender woman in rural South Carolina, providing important guidance on the “because of” causation standard, juror bias claims, and the limits of curative jury instructions.
Background: The Murder of Ernest “Dime” Doe
Daqua Ritter had a long-running secret sexual relationship with Ernest “Dime” Doe, a biological male who presented as a woman in Allendale, South Carolina. Ritter repeatedly pressured Doe to delete their messages and became angry whenever others referenced the relationship. On the day Doe was killed, the two were in Doe’s car when law enforcement pulled Doe over for speeding. Hours later, Doe was found shot dead on a rural road. Ritter surfaced nearby at his uncle’s house, then asked friends to dispose of his firearm and burned his own clothing. A joint state-federal investigation ultimately produced a three-count federal indictment: a gender identity hate crime resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2), using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1), and making false statements to investigators under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). A jury convicted Ritter on all counts, and the court sentenced him to life in prison.
The “Because Of” Standard Under the Federal Hate Crimes Act
The heart of the appeal was whether the government presented sufficient evidence that Ritter killed Doe because of Doe’s gender identity. The Fourth Circuit, applying its earlier ruling in United States v. Hudak, confirmed that the phrase “because of” in 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) incorporates the traditional but-for causation standard—meaning the government must prove the victim’s protected characteristic was a but-for cause of the crime, though it need not be the sole or even primary motive.
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding. Ritter openly discussed his relationships with biological women but went to extraordinary lengths to keep his relationship with Doe secret. When others learned of it, he expressed shame and threatened violence toward Doe. A rational juror could conclude Ritter would not have killed a biological female who was equally indiscreet—meaning Doe’s biological sex (a gender-related characteristic) was a but-for cause of the murder. The court also noted that the statute’s definition of “gender identity” as “actual or perceived gender-related characteristics” creates some textual awkwardness when read alongside the operative provision, but declined to address that ambiguity since Ritter did not raise it.
Juror Bias: Can a Transgender Juror Serve Impartially?
Ritter also challenged the verdict on the ground that Juror 71—a transgender woman who served as the jury’s foreperson—was biased against him. During jury selection, she disclosed her identity and stated it would not affect her decision. After the verdict, she spoke to the press in ways Ritter argued revealed bias. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found her credible and impartial, and denied the motion for a new trial. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that actual bias requires a showing that a juror could not or would not decide the case on the evidence alone. Appellate courts reverse such credibility findings only for manifest error—a demanding standard not met here. Post-verdict juror statements alone rarely establish bias when the trial judge has personally assessed the juror’s credibility across multiple proceedings.
Hearsay and the Limits of Curative Instructions
At trial, a witness inadvertently testified that Ritter’s uncle told her he had “heard that [Ritter] killed Dime Doe.” Both parties agreed the statement was inadmissible hearsay. The defense moved for a mistrial. Instead, the district court issued a thorough curative instruction directing jurors to disregard the statement entirely and reminding them of their oath to follow the court’s instructions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a mistrial, holding that courts presume juries follow curative instructions and that this presumption yields only in exceptional cases involving uniquely vivid or prejudicial evidence—such as a co-defendant’s direct confession. The hearsay here was vague, lacked a source, was later walked back by the witness herself, and was undermined by cross-examination before the curative instruction was even given. Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion.
What This Means for Federal Criminal Defense in North Carolina
The Ritter decision illustrates several important realities for defendants facing federal criminal charges in the Fourth Circuit. The but-for causation standard for hate crimes is not as demanding as defendants might hope—multiple but-for causes can coexist, and the victim’s protected characteristic need not be the primary driver of the crime. Challenges to juror impartiality face an uphill battle given the deference courts extend to trial judges. And inadmissible testimony rarely justifies a mistrial when the court promptly issues a specific curative instruction.
Federal hate crime prosecutions carry potential life sentences and require close coordination between state and federal agencies. As Ritter confirms, federal prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit have a proven framework for pursuing § 249 charges involving gender identity. For related reading, see our posts on federal conspiracy and RICO prosecutions and the Fourth Circuit’s approach to deference in criminal sentencing appeals.
Facing Federal Charges? Contact The Chetson Firm
If you or someone you know is under federal investigation or facing federal criminal charges in North Carolina, experienced legal representation is essential from the earliest stages. Damon Chetson is a Board Certified Specialist in State and Federal Criminal Law—one of fewer than 12 such specialists in Wake County—with more than 25 jury trials and a record of results in complex federal matters, including an acquittal in what was then the largest federal RICO case in U.S. history. Contact The Chetson Firm at 19 W. Hargett St., Suite 400, Raleigh, NC 27601 to schedule a consultation.